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Aesthetics and the Police Power
Robert J. DiCello*
COMPANY, decided in 1926, the United
States Supreme Court said that comprehensive zoning in general is
a valid exercise of the state's police power. Concerning this power Mr.
Newton D. Baker, the distinguished attorney for the appellee, argued:
. . . these powers must be reasonably exercised, and a municipality may not, under the guise of the police power, arbitrarily divert
property from its appropriate and most economical uses or diminish
its value, by imposing restrictions which have no other basis than
the momentary taste of the public authorities.'
N EUCLID V. AMBLER REALTY

Police Power and the General Welfare
Under the Ohio Constitution municipalities have the authority to
exercise all powers of local self-government. 2 This authority is exercised
through police power which is sufficient to support the enactment and
enforcement of a wide variety of regulations which serve the public welfare. The police power, then, is the means whereby there is delegated by
the state to the municipality effective power to promote and protect the
general welfare. The purpose of any enforceable ordinance established
under the police power must be directly related to the general welfare
of the community wherein it operates.
By limiting land to certain specific uses, both the city or municipality
and the abutting property owners stand to gain;3 the former by maintaining reasonable standards of public peace, health and safety so as to foster
a desirable environment for its citizens while also remaining attractive to
perspective domestic and business interests, and the latter by sustaining
existing property values which result from the protective maintenance
of those variables that effect the health, safety, moral fibre and general
welfare of the community.
Most property regulations of a city usually find their legal justification in some aspect of the state police power; a power asserted for the
public, not private, welfare, 4 and which may not properly be in conflict
with general, existing state laws or statutes. 5 It is reasonable that a zon* B.A., John Carroll University; Second-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law
School; Supervisor, U. S. Steel Corp. (Cleveland).
1 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 71 L. Ed. 303, 47 S. Ct. 114 (1926).
2 Ohio Const., Art. 18, §§ 3 & 7 (1912).
3 City of Cleveland Heights v. Glowe, 97 N.E.2d 226 (Court of Appeals, Cuyahoga
County, Ohio 1950).
4 State ex rel. Euverard v. Miller, 98 Ohio App. 283, 129 N.E.2d 209 (Warren County

1954).

5 Broad-Miami Co. v. Board of Zoning Adjustment of City of Columbus, 185 N.E.2d
76 (Common Pleas, Franklin County, Ohio 1959).
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ing ordinance cannot be used to control competition, 6for instance, since
the end result would be a detriment to public welfare.7 However, where
the ordinance calls for a control of population density, or provides standits validity is
ards for sanitation, health, fire safety and crime prevention,
8
unquestioned, since the public welfare is enhanced.
Municipal regulations, therefore, are justified to the extent that the
police power is exercised in the interest of public health, safety and
morals. In the event that the utilization of the police power is unreason9
able or arbitrary the ordinance must fail. For a municipal ordinance to
qualify as unreasonable or arbitrary, it must bear no objective substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare. If a
regulation lacks this necessary substantial relation then it is constitutionally invalid, as it would arbitrarily interfere with the right of enjoyment
10
and use of private property.
Since zoning is primarily a legislative rather than a judicial function, the primary determination of whether or not there exists an objective substantial relation between the regulation and the general welfare
rests with the legislative body of the municipality." Because the legislative body of any municipality usually does not direct its effort towards
creating laws that are inherently unfair, it is presumed that the products
of their deliberative endeavors are constitutionally sound. To rebut this
presumption, it must be very clear that the regulations enacted are
substantial relation to public health, morals and
arbitrary, and lacking in 12
community.
the
of
safety
The Problem
The "obviousness" of lack of substantial or real relation between a
municipal ordinance and the general welfare may become apparent only
when the purpose for which the ordinance was enacted is carefully
examined. For example, Sections 1411.21 (bl) and (b2) of the Codified
Ordinances of the City of Shaker Heights, Ohio-Part Fourteen, the
Housing Code which has been in effect since November 1, 1967-states,
6 Rosenthal v. City of Bedford, 134 N.E.2d 727 (Court of Appeals, Cuyahoga County,
Ohio 1956).
7 State ex rel. Grant v. Kiefaber, 114 Ohio App. 279, 181 N.E.2d 905, affirmed 171
Ohio St. 326, 170 N.E.2d 848 (1960).
421
8 Nolden v. East Cleveland City Commission, 12 Ohio Misc. 205, 232 N.E.2d
(Common Pleas, Cuyahoga County 1966).
9 Stulbarg v. Leighton, 113 Ohio App. 487, 173 N.E.2d 715 (1957).
10 City of Toledo v. Miller, 106 Ohio App. 290, 154 N.E.2d 169 (Court of Appeals,
Lucas County 1957).
11 Shopping Centers of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 173 N.E.2d 196
(Common Pleas, Hamilton County, Ohio), affirmed 109 Ohio App. 189, 164 N.E.2d
593 (1959).
12 State v. Peebles, 25 Ohio L. Abs. 545, appeal dismissed, 133 Ohio St. 130, 10 Ohio
Op. 130 (1937).
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with reference to the maintenance of exteriors of dwelling and appurtenant structures, that:
1) All buckled, rotted or decayed walls, doors, windows,
porches, floors, steps, railings, soffits, posts, sills, trim and their
missing members must be replaced and put in good condition.
2) All replacement must match and conform to original design
or be replaced completely.
Consider the citizen whose porch is enhanced by a delicate provincial
trim, a small portion of which buckles in the heat or severe cold of the
climate. It would seem reasonable for him to replace the damaged portion of the trim without matching and conforming to the original design,
providing his efforts did not produce a condition inimical to the general
well-being of his neighbors and the community at large. However, under
Section 1411.21 (b2), the citizen must replace the damaged portion of
trim to match the original design or replace the entire trim. Here, there
is no undebatably substantial relation between regulation and the public
health, morals, safety and general welfare of the community; and the
ordinance may be arbitrary and unreasonable. The considerations behind
the above sub-sections are primarily aesthetic; that is, repair the trim so
that it does not appear offensive to the eye of the beholder. It would
seem in this instance that aesthetic considerations are placed on equal
footing with "the general welfare" of the people of Shaker Heights.
Another Shaker Heights' regulation which may be said to be less
clearly as arbitrary as Sections 1411.21 (bl) and (b2) is Section 1411.24,
which has also been in effect since November 1, 1967, and reads:
Exterior property areas of all premises shall be kept free of any
debris, object, material or condition which may create a health, accident or fire hazard, or which is a public nuisance, OR (emphasis
added) which constitutes a blighting or deteriorating influence on
the neighborhood. Lawns, landscaping and driveways shall also be
maintained so as not to constitute a blighting or deteriorating effect
in the neighborhood.
Perhaps the most precise interpretation is attained by the application
of the either/or test; to paraphrase the ordinance, one would be in
violation of Section 1411.24 if his exterior property area were in such
a condition as to either impair the health, safety and welfare of the
community or to appear blighting or deteriorating to the eye of the
beholder. To follow the rules of English grammar and to observe logic
would necessarily make the latter part of the ordinance as binding as
the former. Here, the standard of determining that which threatens the
promotion of the general welfare is subjective; what seems to be blighting or deteriorating to one man may not seem so to another. The issue in
question is whether the police power is broad enough to prevent blight
and deterioration. If the police power is invoked for such considerations
then, I submit, the ordinance must fail for aesthetic subjectivism, since
Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1969

3

AESTHETICS AND POLICE POWER

that which would constitute blight and deterioration would be a fact
question in continuous dispute.
For example, is grass that is neatly kept, but four inches high,
blighting, as opposed to a yard with no grass at all; is a driveway that
has one crack that appears ugly because it is safely sealed with tar more
deterioratingthan a driveway possessing many cracks that appears even
uglier because they are all safely sealed with tar; is an untrimmed
hedge more or less blighting and deteriorating than a trimmed hedge
that is ten feet in height?
I submit that the police power is limited to the preservation and
promotion of those perceptible aspects of the general welfare that are
veritably threatened by adverse forces objectively discernible. The
regulations enforceable by the police power must, therefore, be precise
and specific as to the evils that they are intended to prevent.
Where, as with Section 1411.21 of the Shaker Heights Housing Code,
the regulation may be interpreted through subjective aesthetic standards,
I believe that it lacks the necessary substantial relation to the general
welfare and is therefore an arbitrary and unreasonable restriction upon
the use of private property. Again, it would appear that individual subjective aesthetic considerations are placed on an equal standing with
"the general welfare" of the people of Shaker Heights, an equilibrium
which is against the great weight of precedent in Ohio and throughout
13
the country.
Majority Considerations
The traditional rule, which holds that aesthetic considerations as a
primary motivation to the enactment of municipal ordinances are insufficient to restrict the use of property, extends itself to hold ordinances
valid where the regulation has a real or reasonable relation to the general
welfare of the community and the aesthetic consideration is auxiliary or
incidental to the health, morals and safety of the public. 14 The sections
of the Shaker Heights' ordinances at issue cannot qualify under the
majority of holdings, since the aesthetic considerations behind them are
not incidental; rather they are equal to the consideration for the public
welfare.
In an Ohio case decided in 1959,15 the court summarized:
In short, the benefit from zoning use limitations to the public
health, safety, morals or general welfare must be sufficient to
Murdock v. City of Norwood, 3 Ohio Supp. 278, 9 Ohio Op. 399 (Common Pleas,
Hamilton County 1937); Cleveland Trust Co. v. Village of Brooklyn, 92 Ohio App.
351, 110 N.E.2d 440 (Court of Appeals, Cuyahoga County), appeal dismissed, 158
Ohio St. 258, 108 N.E.2d 679 (1952).
14 Pritz v. Messer, 2 Ohio L. Abs. 620, reversed 112 Ohio St. 628, 149 N.E. 30 (1925).
15 Curtiss v. City of Cleveland, 170 Ohio St. 127, 163 N.E.2d 682 (1959).
13
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reasonably outweigh the loss to the landowner in order to justify
zoning legislation causing such loss by limiting such owner's right to
use his property.
Wherein lies the benefit to the general welfare that outweighs the
financial hardship to a Shaker Heights resident who is called upon to
repair a worn and cracked driveway; a condition hardly threatening the
health, safety or morals of the city? Or consider the resident whose lawn
is weed-infested and discolored and who has already gone to reasonable
lengths to remedy the situation. He too must finally submit to the police
power and go to greater lengths and more costly means in an effort to
prevent his premises from constituting a "blighting" influence on the
neighborhood. It would seem to be stretching one's legal imagination to
categorize these situations as public nuisances and thereby to justify the
state's police power in order to abate them, since neither a driveway in
need of repair nor a lawn that is weed ridden obstructs or causes inconvenience or damage to the public in the exercise of rights common
to all people living in the community;16 rather, there is no substantial
annoyance, inconvenience or injury to the public. 17
The use of the words "which constitutes a blighting or deteriorating
influence on the neighborhood" in Section 1411.24 of the Housing Code
seem to evidence a legislative attempt to conserve property values within
a well-established community. Shaker Heights is a wealthy and handsome community, long established as such.
Thus, the idea is that if the condition of any residence is in a state of
disrepair to the extent that it might adversely affect the value of abutting
properties, the municipality, through its police power, may do whatever
is necessary to remedy the ailing premises, thereby enhancing the property value of adjoining dwellings.' s By utilizing its police power as an
instrument of effective suburban maintenance and renewal, a municipality then takes upon itself a responsibility for providing teams of
qualified housing inspectors who must canvass thousands of residences
and give professional evaluation treatment to each. Those houses
requiring notice of violation must be given special attention with reference to bringing the individual who is in violation of the law to an
understanding of what has to be done and why he must do it. Financial
inadequacy of the guilty generates the need for the municipality to offer
assistance in securing financing adequate to restore that which provoked
the notice of violation; meanwhile checking progress of those owners
16 State ex rel. Chalfin v. Glick, 113 Ohio App,. 23, 177 N.E.2d 293 (Court of Appeals,
Hardin County, Ohio), quoting 66 C.J.S. Nuisances §§ 1, lila & b, affirmed 172 Ohio
St. 249, 175 N.E.2d 68 (1961).
17 Gates Co. v. Housing Appeals Bd. of City of Columbus, 10 Ohio St. 2d 48, 225
N.E. 2d 222 (1967).
18 Interview with Mr. Paul Donaldson, Assistant Law Director for the City of
Shaker Heights (January 21, 1969).
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required to repair or restore their premises and even commencing ap19
Suburban conservation
propriate legal proceedings when necessary.
effected through such a thorough exercise of the police power is an epic
20
task indeed where the municipality houses in excess of 13,000 families,
with the time required to effectively service the properties of all of them
being in the vicinity of ten years. 2 1 Such a municipal undertaking is
commendable and unquestionably valid provided that the regulations are
in line with the needs of the public. It must be noted however, that local
governments are under no duty to utilize the police power to realize the
22
Rather, local
most profitable use for the owner of a parcel of land.

governments are bound to preserve and promote the health, safety,
morals and general welfare of the governed.
If conservation of property values be the prime consideration of
Section 1411.24 of the Shaker Heights Housing Code, then perhaps a redrafting nearer to the intended meaning would extricate the Section from
controversy. As it stands, the police power probably is unauthorized
merely for the purpose to promote and protect the appearance of the
neighborhood for appearances sake. 23 Property values may not be
guarded by aesthetic considerations alone; other factors such as sewage
disposal, garbage collection, crime control and fire prevention are of
greater significance to the general welfare, even with aesthetic appeal
viewed as a highly favorable incidental consequence.
Minority Considerations
A more liberal and contrasting view, with which the courts seem to
be flirting, expounds an aesthetic equation, the product of which makes
aesthetics of equal or greater importance than the traditional considerations of the public need.24 Newton D. Baker, a noted authority on zoning
regulation, wrote an impressive but substantially tempered attack on the
establishment of aesthetic subordination as a response to the problems
generated by the onslaught of urban development that accompanied
the maturation of the industrial epoch in the mid-1920's. 2 5 Baker considered beauty to be a valuable property right, and labeled those few
courts sustaining aesthetic regulation as most progressive; however, his
19
20

Ibid.
Furnished by the Finance Department of the City of Shaker Heights (January 28,

1969).
21 Supra, note 18.
22 Beachland Glass Co. v. Woodmansee, 11 Ohio Misc. 262, 230 N.E.2d 360 (Common
Pleas, Cuyahoga County 1967).
23 State ex rel. Srigley v. Woodworth, 33 Ohio App. 406, 169 N.E. 713 (Athens County
1929).
24 Criterion Service v. City of East Cleveland, 88 N.E.2d 300 (Court of Appeals,
Cuyahoga County), appeal dismissed, 152 Ohio St. 416, 89 N.E.2d 475 (1949).
25 Baker, Aesthetic Zoning Regulations, 25 Mich. L. Rev. 124 (1926-1927).
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mood softens as he concludes that aesthetic and cultural considerations in
municipal developments ought to be fostered with reasonable limita2 61
tions.
Writing with equal conviction but sparing no reservation for the
traditional, Professor Paul Sayre finds economic opportunity in the
beautiful by reasoning that since aesthetics maintains property values,
the greater the aesthetic content of the property the more it is worth, and
consequently it will yield greater tax revenues which in turn can be used
to pay for schools, playgrounds, sewers and other benefits which promote
the health and safety of the public at large, thereby making aesthetics a
community need worthy of the protection of the police power.27 Professor Sayre can see no reason for differentiating between aesthetics and
morals by using the reverse of the philosophical truism that there exists
a moral element in all aesthetics; consequently, the general welfare may
be defined as the health, safety and morals or aesthetics of the public. 28
A most recent case, decided on December 31, 1968, by the Ohio
Supreme Court, lends support to this liberal view by holding that under
some circumstances aesthetic considerataions alone will justify the use of
the police power.29 However, in this case, which involved a junk yard
inadequately fenced to the extent that the junk cars were stacked so
high above the fence that they were visible from two highways, the
court carefully limited its application of aesthetic justification to a
particular fact situation which was "patently gross and offensive" to the
general welfare. 30 The condition of the junk yard was beyond the subjectivism of taste; its flagrance posed an obstacle to the promotion of the
general welfare. The court hastened to point out that its decision was not
to be interpreted as a general admission that aesthetic considerations
alone were sufficient to invoke the police power; each fact situation would
have to be carefully considered with respect to its detrimental effect upon
the general well-being of the public.31 In view of the court's opinion, the
general welfare might be defined as the safety, health, morals and sometimes the aesthetics of the community.
Section 1411.24 of the Shaker Heights housing ordinance possesses
high meaning under the shade of the minority view. Appealing as it may
seem, aesthetics as a controlling factor behind municipal housing ordinances poses a very real threat to the individual's right to use property
in a reasonable manner in harmony with the rights of others. If the
26

Ibid.

Sayre, Aesthetics and Property Values: Does Zoning Promote the Public Welfare?
35 A.B.A.J. 471 (1949).
27

28

Ibid.

29

State v. Buckley, 16 Ohio St. 2d 128 (December 31, 1968).

30

Ibid.
Id.

31
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minority view were to prevail, it is conceivable that the municipality
could easily become the sole dictator of what is reasonable and what is
unreasonable; what is beautiful and what is ugly. Then, the exercise of
the police power could not In tagged arbitrary since it would merely be
enforcing the will of the legislature whose terrible task would be to
decide what was aesthetically best for all. There would be little
uniformity among municipalities and what was pleasing to the eyes of
the legislators in one city would suddenly become ominous to the legislators in another. The consequences of aesthetic control would become
to the impairment and general
untenable and ultimately conducive
32
destruction of the public welfare.
A Proposal
Certainly, if Section 1411.24 were re-written to read as follows, the
same legislative objectives could be attained as those hoped for under the
present writing:
Exterior property areas of all premises including lawns, landscaping and driveways shall be kept free of any debris, object, material or condition which may create a health, accident, or fire hazard,
or which is a public nuisance.
I submit that if any exterior property area of any residence was not
cluttered with debris, objects or material and in such a condition so as
not to issue propensity to health, accident or fire hazards and which
therefore would not pose a public nuisance would not constitute a blighting or deteriorating influence on the neighborhood wherein the dwelling
resides. It must be conceded that as time goes on neighborhoods and the
houses that constitute them will grow old and the general area will reflect
the weathering of the decades. However, to describe a neighborhood as
old is not to offer that it is in conflict with the general welfare of the
community; on the contrary, many families of low income groups are
directly benefited by time's consequence on residential areas once inhabited by the families of middle and high income groups. This economic
benefit should not be regarded as a detriment to any city; rather, it
should be thought of as an evolutionary advantage to those less fortunate
citizens who have every right to the pursuits of life, liberty and happiness.
Indeed, an aging community may be kept just as safe, healthy and
consequently just as neat and conducive to those high ideals of the
general welfare as the fresh, new and undoubtedly more expensive community. It must be pointed out that in both instances the welfare of the
public in general can be served without resorting to highly subjective
aesthetic ideals.
Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 112 Ohio St. 654, 148 N.E. 842, 43 A.L.R. 662
(1925).

32
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